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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of an interlocutory appeal 
from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or capital 
felony under §78-2-2 (3) (h), Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the lower court err in denying the motion of the Defendant 
Oklevueha Native American Church and its spiritual leaders, the Defendants 
James and Linda Mooney, to dismiss the multiple first and second degree 
felony charges against them for "controlled substance criminal enterprise" 
under §58-37-8(1 )(a)(iv) of the Utah Controlled Substances Act, §§58-37-1 
et seq.; for forfeiture of the Defendant Church's property under §58-37-
13(l)(g)(2)(a) of the Utah Controlled Substances Act, and for racketeering 
under the §76-10-1603 of the "Pattern Of Unlawful Activity Act", §§76-10-
1601 et. seq., based on the Defendants' argument that their conduct as 
members of the Defendant Oklevueha Native American Church, in 
possessing and providing peyote to other Church members for religious use 
in bona fide ceremonies of the Defendant Oklevueha Native American 
Church in Benjamin, Utah, is exempt from criminal prosecution under the 
federal exception from criminal prosecution for the religious use of peyote 
"by members of the Native American Church" contained in 21 C.F.R. 
§3107.31 and incorporated in §58-37-4 (2) (a) (iii) of the Utah Controlled 
Substances Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Utah Statutory Exemption")? 
2. Does the lower court's interpretation of the phrase "members of 
the Native American Church" contained in the Utah Statutory Exemption, as 
excluding (1) non-Indian members of the Defendant Oklevueha Native 
American Church, and/or (2) Indian members of the Native American 
Church who are not members of a federally recognized tribe, violate the 
Defendants' rights against an establishment of religion by the State, and 
their rights to freely exercise their fundamental religious beliefs and 
practices without State interference, under Article I, sections 1 and 4, and 
Article III, section 1, of the Utah Constitution? 
3. Does the lower court's interpretation of the phrase "members of 
the Native American Church" contained in the Utah Statutory Exemption, as 
excluding (1) non-Indian members of the Native American Church, and/or 
(2) Indian members of the Native American Church who are not members of 
a federally recognized tribe, violate the Defendants' rights to the equal 
operation of the laws under Article I, section 24, of the Utah Constitution? 
4. If the lower court's racially and politically restrictive 
interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption is correct, which the 
Defendants dispute, does the Utah Statutory Exemption violate the 
Defendants' rights to due process of law under Article I, section 7, of the 
Utah Constitution, because the Exemption is vague on its face and as applied 
to the Defendants, because the language of the Exemption fails to provide 
adequate notice to ordinary citizens, including the Defendants, that the 
language "members of the Native American Church" used in the Exemption, 
excludes (1) non-Indian members of the Church, and/or (2) Indian members 
of the Native American Church who are not members of a federally 
recognized tribe? 
5. Does the lower court's interpretation of the phrase "members of 
the Native American Church" contained in the Utah Statutory Exemption, as 
excluding (1) non-Indian members of the Native American Church, and/or 
(2) Indian members of the Native American Church who are not members of 
a federally recognized tribe, violate the Defendants' rights against an 
establishment of religion by the State, and their rights to freely exercise their 
religious beliefs and practices under the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution? 
6. Does the lower court's interpretation of the phrase "members of 
the Native American Church" in the Utah Statutory Exemption, as excluding 
non-Indian members of the Native American Church, and/or Indian 
members of the Native American Church who are not members of a 
federally recognized tribe, violate the Defendants' rights to the equal 
protection of the laws guaranteed to Defendants under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The district court's rulings on issues of law are reviewed for 
correctness, granting no deference to the lower court's decision. Bradford v. 
Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, 1J10, 993 P.2d 887 (citations omitted), cert, 
denied, Bradford v. Demita, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
All of the issues presented in this appeal were preserved in the 
Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Information and supporting and reply 
memoranda and affidavits and in the State's opposition memorandum in the 
lower court, See, Case No. 001404536 (hereinafter, "Case No. 36"), R. 113-
175, 191-198; 237-256; Case No. 001404537 (hereinafter, "Case No. 37"), 
R. 86-87, 88-164, 177-184; Case No. 001404538 (hereinafter, "Case No. 
38), R. 75-76; 85-145; 150-157, 186-195)', in the Preliminary Hearing, R. 
1 The lower court maintained separate files on each of the three Defen-
dants but did not file copies of each pleading and memorandum filed by the 
parties, which were intended to apply to all of the Defendants, in each case 
file. Hence, Appellants have referenced the record of each case file where a 
cited pleading or memorandum appears. 
287/5-15, and in the oral argument on the Defendants' Motion To Dismiss 
Information, R. 219/1-27. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 1 
[Inherent and unalienable rights.] All men have the inherent and 
inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to 
acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to the 
dictates of their own conscience; to assemble peaceably, protest 
against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to 
communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for 
the abuse of that right. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 4 
[Religious liberty-No property qualification to vote or hold office.] 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be required as a 
qualification for any office of public trust or for any vote at any 
election; nor shall any person be incompetent as a witness or juror on 
account of religious belief or the absence thereof. There shall be no 
union of Church and State, nor shall any church dominate the State or 
interfere with its functions. No public money or property shall be 
appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or 
instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No 
property qualification shall be required of any person to vote, or hold 
office, except as provided in this Constitution. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7 
[Due process of law.] No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24 
[Uniform operation of laws.] All laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform construction. 
The Utah Controlled Substances Act, 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, §§ 58-37-1 et. seq., 
See Addendum 3. 
(The Utah) Pattern Of Unlawful Activity Act 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, §§76-10-1601 et. seq., 
See Addendum 4. 
United States Constitution, First Amendment 
[Religious and political freedom.] Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; 
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for the redress of grievances. 
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
(The Federal) Controlled Substances Act of 1970,21 U.S.C. §801 et seq. 
(1970), See, Addendum 5. 
Federal Exemption for Religious Use of Peyote By 
Members of the Native American Church, 28 CFR § 1307.31: 
Native American Church. The listing of peyote as a controlled 
substance in Schedule I does not apply to the nondrug use of peyote 
in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American Church, 
and members of the Native American Church so using peyote are 
exempt from registration. Any person who manufactures peyote for 
or distributes peyote to the Native American Church is required to 
obtain registration annually and to comply with all other 
requirements of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of This Action And Appeal 
This appeal arises out of the State's prosecution of the Defendant 
Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American Church ("Defendant Native 
American Church") and its spiritual leaders, the Defendants James Warren 
Flaming Eagle Mooney and Linda Mooney, on multiple first and second 
degree felony charges for their alleged unlawful possession and distribution 
of a controlled substance and racketeering, based on the Defendants' 
conduct in possessing and providing peyote to other members of the 
Defendant Native American Church for religious use in bona fide 
ceremonies of the Defendant Native American Church in Utah County, 
State of Utah. The Defendants appeal from an interlocutory ruling by Judge 
Gary D. Stott of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, State of 
Utah, dated September 15,2001, denying the Defendants' motion to dismiss 
the criminal charges against them on state statutory and constitutional 
grounds and on federal constitutional grounds. See, Ruling, Addendum I. 
B. Proceedings And Disposition In The Lower Court 
On November 27, 2000, the State, through the Utah County Attorney, 
by Information charged the Defendant Native American Church and the 
Defendant James Mooney, with twelve first degree felony counts of 
"controlled substance criminal enterprise" pursuant to §58-37-8(1 )(a)(iv) of 
the Utah Controlled Substances Act, §§58-37-1 et seq.2 Defendant Linda 
Mooney was charged with three first degree felony counts under the Act.3 
See, Information, Addendum 2. In the Information, the State also sought 
forfeiture of the Defendant Native American Church building and its 
property in Utah County, pursuant to §58-37-13 of the Utah Controlled 
Substances Act, based on an allegation that the Defendant Native American 
Church and its property is "located in close proximity to a controlled 
substance, or used to facilitate the manufacture, possession, distribution or 
transportation of a controlled substance." See, Utah Controlled Substances 
Act, Addendum 3. The Information also charged James and Linda Mooney 
with one second degree felony count of racketeering or "pattern of unlawful 
activity" under §76-10-1603 of the "Pattern Of Unlawful Activity Act", 
§§76-10-1601 et. seq., Addendum 4. See also, Information, Addendum 2. 
2 All statutory references are to Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, 
unless otherwise indicated. 
3 Under §58-37-8(d) of the Utah Controlled Substances Act, conviction of 
each first degree felony count carries a mandatory penalty of "an indeter-
minate term of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposi-
tion or execution of sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation." See, Utah Controlled Substances Act, Addendum 3. 
On May 16,2001, the Defendants filed Defendants' Motion To 
Dismiss Information and a supporting memorandum, seeking dismissal of 
the criminal charges against them on state statutory and constitutional 
ground and on federal constitutional grounds. See, Case No. 36, R. 113-114; 
115-175; Case No. 37, R.86-87; 88-164); Case No. 38, R. 75-76; 85-145. 
On May 17, 2001, a Preliminary Hearing on the criminal charges 
against the Defendants was held in the lower court. The court declined to 
hear the Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Information at that time and 
proceeded with the Preliminary Hearing subject to a later ruling on the 
Motion. See, Preliminary Hearing Transcript, R. 287/ 5-13; 152-155. 
During the Preliminary Hearing, the witnesses subpoenaed by the 
State testified that they were either members, or invited guests of members, 
of the Defendant Native American Church. The witnesses testified that they 
received peyote from the Defendants James or Linda Mooney, or another 
spiritual leader, for use in religious ceremonies of the Defendant Native 
American Church at the Defendant Church in Benjamin, Utah. R. 287, at 
17/18-27/4; 27/10-35/22; 36/13-46/17; 46/24-55/10; 55/18-60/17; 61/13-
68/5; 69/13-76/25; 77/10-85/25; 84/19-85/11; 86/12-91/19; 92/3-99/10; 
99/16-107/10. Several witnesses testified that members of the Defendant 
Native American Church were not required to make donations to participate 
in any Native American Church ceremonies, including peyote ceremonies. 
R. 287, at 44/9-23; 54/2-55/3; 67/3-25. 
At the conclusion of the Preliminary Hearing, the lower court denied 
the Defendants1 motions to dismiss the criminal charges, stating that, even 
accepting the Defendants1 argument that, "they were somehow doing what 
they were entitled to do legally" ... "I don't have any information that says 
that any of the people who appeared here as witnesses today who received 
Peyote were Indians, that they were entitled to receive the Peyote." R. 285, 
at 3/18-4/3. The lower court bound the Defendants over for trial pending a 
hearing on the Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Information on state and 
federal constitutional and statutory grounds. R. 285, at 4/4-7/9. 
On June 4, 2001, the Defendants filed a Supplemental Memorandum 
In Support Of Their Motion To Dismiss Information with the Affidavit of 
Salvador Johnson, demonstrating that Defendant Native American Church 
and the Defendant James Mooney, as its spiritual leader, had legally 
obtained the peyote distributed to Church members for religious purposes. 
See, Case No. 36, R. 191-194; Case No. 37, R. 177-180; Case No. 38, R. 
150-157. See also, Affidavit of Salvador Johnson, Addendum 6. 
On June 25, 2001, the State filed their Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion To Dismiss. See, Case No. 36, R. 199-236; Case No. 37, R. 185-224; 
Case No. 38, R.158-195, and on July 11, 2001, the Defendants filed their 
Reply Memorandum in support of their Motion To Dismiss. See, Case No. 
36, 237-256; Case No. 37 (not copied); Case No. 38 (not copied). 
On August 1, 2001, the lower court heard oral argument on the Defen-
dants' Motion To Dismiss. R. 286. Thereafter, on September 15, 2001, the 
lower court entered a Ruling On Defendant's (sic) Motion To Dismiss, 
denying the Motion. See, Ruling, Case No. 36, R. 260-269; Case No. 37, 
R.228-237; Case No. 38, R. 198-207, Addendum 1. 
On October 3, 2001, the Defendants filed a Petition For Permission 
To File An Interlocutory Appeal of the lower court's Ruling On Defendant's 
(sic) Motion To Dismiss, which was granted by Order of this Court dated 
December 4, 2001. 
C. Statement of Relevant Facts 
In addition to the foregoing facts regarding the lower court proceedings 
herein, the following undisputed facts were presented in the lower court and 
are relevant to this appeal.4 
4 In its Ruling, the lower court incorrectly states that the Defendants did 
not recite any facts to support their Motion To Dismiss. See, "Statement of 
Material Facts", Ruling, at 2, Addendum 1. Conversely, Defendants recited 
seventeen paragraphs of "undisputed facts" in the Memorandum In Support 
of Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Information, Case No. 36, R. 171-175; 
Case No. 37, R. 160-164; Case No. 38, R. 141-145. Defendants also 
presented evidentiary facts in the Affidavit of Salvador Johnson attached to 
1. The Defendants James and Linda Mooney are husband and 
wife. They are members and have served as the spiritual leaders of the 
Defendant Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American Church of Utah, Inc., 
since James Mooney established the Church in April, 1997, pursuant to the 
blessing and support of the Rosebud Native American Church of South 
Dakota. See, Case No. 37, R. 163,1J1; Case No. 36, R. 245, ^ 4; 240, f3. 
2. The Defendant Native American Church is a domestic, non-
profit corporation in good standing and authorized to conduct business in the 
State of Utah by the Utah Department of Commerce. The Church is located 
in Benjamin, Utah. See, Case No. 37, R. 163, ffl[ 2, 6; 127; Case No. 36, R. 
245,W-5. 
3. The Defendant Native American Church is one of more than 
1,800 churches and/or chapters that comprise the Native American Church. 
Each Church and/or chapter operates under its own by-laws and is free to 
define its own membership. Membership in the Defendant Oklevueha 
Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum, Case No. 36, R. 191-194; Case 
No. 37, R. 177-184; Case No. 38, R. 150-157. The State did not contest any 
of these facts in its Opposition to Motion To Dismiss, Case No. 36, (not 
copied); Case No. 37, R. 222-224; Case No. 38, R. 193-195. Defendants also 
set forth additional evidentiary facts in the Affidavits of James and Linda 
Mooney in their Reply Memorandum, Case No. 36, R. 237-246, 254-255; 
Case No. 37 (not copied); Case No. 38 (not copied) which the State did not 
later dispute or move to strike. Thus, this Court should regard these facts as 
undisputed for purposes of this appeal. 
Native American Church is open to all individuals who embrace its 
fundamental religious beliefs and practices, including the worship of peyote 
as a deity and sacrament. Prior to the institution of the criminal proceedings 
against the Defendants, the Church had approximately 200-300 members. 
The Church is financially supported by donations from its members, See, 
Case No. 36, R. 244, ^ 8-11, and issues membership cards to all of its 
members. See, Case No. 37, R. 163,1j 2; 124-125. 
4. Defendant James Mooney is a descendent of Native American 
Indians indigenous to the United States, including the Creek, Cherokee and 
Choctaw (Seminole) Indians and has been a member of a Seminole Tribe 
which is not a federally recognized tribe. See, Case No. 36, R. 245, f 3. 
5. Prior to founding the Defendant Native American Church, 
James Mooney practiced the Native American religion as a member of other 
Native American Church chapters, and also participated as a volunteer and 
later as an employee of the State, in providing Native American Indian 
programs and services to inmates at the Central Utah Correctional Facility 
(CUCF) where he received commendations for his service.5 See, Case No. 
5 For several years prior to 1993, James Mooney assisted the police 
department in Hurricane, Utah, in controlling the drug problems in that city, 
and was certified as a police officer by state authorities in September, 1994. 
See, Case No. 37, R. 162,1J 8, 10; 144; 137. 
36, R. 244-245, ffi[7; 240, f7; Case No. 37, R. 161-163, ffl|4-7, 9, 11; 146; 
139-140; 135; 132. Linda Mooney was also active as a volunteer in the 
Native American programs at CUCF. Case No. 37, R. 163,1|12; 130 (top). 
6. Since 1997, the Defendant Oklevueha Native American Church 
and James Mooney have been authorized to obtain peyote for religious use 
under regulations of the Texas Department of Public Safety and the United 
States Drug Enforcement Agency ("USDEA"). See, Case No. 36, R. 243-
244, TCI 12-13; 195; Case No. 37, R. 161, ffil 14-15; 122, 113. See also, 
Affidavit of Salvador Johnson, Addendum 6. All sales of peyote to James 
Mooney are documented by receipts issued by the Texas Department of 
Public Safety Narcotics Services under the auspices of the USDEA. See, 
Case No. 37, R. 161,1f 15; 109. 
7. Peyote is considered a deity and sacrament by members of the 
Defendant Oklevueha Native American Church. The Church has never 
denied any member the opportunity to participate in a Church ceremony 
involving the religious use of peyote because the member did or did not 
make a donation to the Church. Case No. 36, R. 243, f^ 14. 
8. At all times prior to the instigation of the pending criminal 
charges against them, the Defendants James and Linda Mooney had a good 
faith, reasonable belief that their conduct in possessing and providing peyote 
to other members of the Defendant Oklevueha Native American Church for 
religious use, was protected under the language of the federal exemption 
incorporated in the Utah Controlled Substances Act, as interpreted in U.S. v. 
Boyll 774 F. Supp. 1333 (D.N.M. 1991), and consciously sought to conform 
their conduct to the requirements of law as members and spiritual leaders of 
the Defendant Oklevueha Native American Church. See, Case No. 36, R. 
255-256, 246, 243 fflf 15-17; 241, 2381ffll5-l7. 
9. On October 10, 2000, the Utah County officials, acting 
pursuant to a warrant, entered Defendant Oklevueha Native American 
Church in Benjamin, Utah, and illegally searched the premises and seized 
the Defendant Church's sacred pipes, peyote, office equipment, membership 
lists and donation records. Utah County police officers and investigators 
placed Church members under intense surveillance, interrogated them 
regarding their religious beliefs and practices and those of other Church 
members, and threatened Church members with criminal prosecution for 
participating in Native American Church ceremonies which involve the 
worship of peyote as a sacrament and deity. On November 28, 2000, the 
State filed the pending criminal charges against the Defendants. Two days 
later, the Defendants brought suit in the United States District Court seeking 
to redress the violations of the Defendants' state and federal constitutional 
rights by the State. See, Complaint, Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American 
Church of Utah, Inc., et al. v. Kay Brvson, Case No. 2:00 CV 935K 
(U.S.D.C. Utah), Addendum 7. The State moved to dismiss the action based 
on abstention due to the pending criminal prosecution. Judge Dale A. 
Kimball of the federal district court granted the motion, expressing 
confidence that the Defendants could obtain an adequate remedy for the 
violation of their constitutional and statutory rights in the state courts. See, 
Order, Addendum 8. Thereafter, the criminal prosecution of the Defendants 
continued in the lower court, until the lower court issued the interlocutory 
Ruling challenged in this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Defendant Oklevueha Native American Church and its spiritual 
leaders, the Defendants James and Linda Mooney, are exempt from criminal 
prosecution for possessing and providing peyote to members of the 
Defendant Oklevueha Native American Church for religious use in bona fide 
Church ceremonies, under the federal exception from criminal prosecution 
for the religious use of peyote by members of the Native American Church 
contained in 21 C.F.R. §3107.31 and incorporated in §58-37-4(2)(a)(iii) of 
the Utah Controlled Substances Act, (referred to herein as the "Utah 
Statutory Exemption.") Accordingly, the lower court erred in not dismissing 
the criminal prosecution against the Defendants under the exemption. 
The racially and politically restrictive interpretation of the language 
"members of the Native American Church" contained in the Utah Statutory 
Exemption advocated by the State and adopted by the lower court, as 
excluding coverage under the Exemption for: (1) non-Indian members of the 
Native American Church, and (2) Native American Indian members of the 
Native American Church who are not members of a federally recognized 
tribe, is contrary to the plain language of the Utah Statutory Exemption and 
the evidence demonstrating that many Native American Church chapters and 
churches, including the Defendant Oklevueha Native American Church, 
have historically included as members, non-Indians and Native American 
Indians who are not members of a federally recognized tribe, who embrace 
the fundamental religious beliefs and practices of the Native American 
Church. 
It is undisputed that the worship of peyote as a sacrament and deity 
in Church ceremonies, is at the core of Native American Church beliefs and 
practices. Thus, the lower court's racially and politically restrictive 
interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption, effects a de facto 
disqualification from membership in the Native American Church, for 
(1) non-Indians, and (2) Native American Indians who are not members of a 
federally recognized tribe, by excluding these classes of individuals from the 
protection against criminal prosecution for the religious use of peyote 
granted to "members of the Native American Church" under the Utah 
Statutory Exemption. 
The decision as to who may become a member of the Defendant 
Oklevueha Native American Church is an internal decision of the Defendant 
Church. To have the State dictate the membership of the Defendant 
Oklevueha Native American Church at all, let alone on the basis race and 
political status, constitutes an intolerable interference and entanglement of 
the State with the Defendant Oklevueha Native American Church. 
The State does not restrict the membership of any other religious 
group within its jurisdiction, and has no compelling interest in doing so, or 
in preferring one religion to another by dictating the membership of the 
Native American Church but not the membership of other churches. 
Similarly, the State does not have any compelling interest in 
discriminating between Native American Indian members of the Native 
American Church in the protection of their right to use peyote for religious 
purposes, on the basis of their unrelated political status, e.g. membership in 
a federally recognized tribe. 
Moreover, the lower court's racially and politically restrictive 
interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption, violates the Defendants' 
rights to freely exercise their fundamental religious beliefs and practices as 
members of the Defendant Oklevueha Native American Church, and violates 
their rights to the equal operation of the laws, by exposing otherwise 
similarly situated members of the Defendant Church to different legal 
consequences, solely because of their race and political status. 
Because the effect of the lower court's interpretation of the Utah 
Statutory Exemption burdens the Defendants' fundamental rights and effects 
a prohibited classification based on race, it cannot be sustained unless the 
State provides evidence to prove that such an interpretation is necessary, and 
is the least restrictive means, to achieve a "compelling interest" of the State, 
which would override the claimed infringement of the Defendants' religious 
rights under Article I, section 1,4 and 24, and Article III, section 1 of the 
Utah Constitution, and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution. 
The United States Supreme Court abandoned the "compelling 
interest" test in Employment Division, Dept. of Human Services of Oregon 
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 1603, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876 (1990), in 
upholding a "neutral and generally applicable" Oregon law criminalizing the 
possession of peyote. However, the Utah Statutory Exemption at issue is 
neither "neutral" nor "generally applicable", being specifically directed to 
the religious use of peyote by "members of the Native American Church." 
Hence, the traditional "compelling interest" test applies in determining 
whether the lower court's racially and politically restrictive interpretation of 
the Utah Statutory Exemption violates the Defendants' state and federal 
constitutional rights. 
In this case, the State has failed to present evidence of any "compel-
ling interest" for preferring and exempting from criminal prosecution Native 
American Indian members of the Native American Church who are 
members of federally recognized tribes, while excluding (1) non-Indian 
members, and (2) Native American Indian members who are not members of 
a federally recognized tribe, from the protection of the Utah Statutory 
Exemption. The State has also failed to adduce any evidence that the racially 
and politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption is 
necessary, or the least restrictive means, of furthering any "compelling 
interest", which would override the infringement on the Defendants' 
constitutional and statutory rights. 
Finally, the lower court erred in failing to dismiss the criminal 
prosecution against the Defendants as a violation of their right to due 
process of law under Article I, section 7, of the Utah Constitution, because 
even if the lower court's racially and politically restrictive interpretation of 
the Utah Statutory Exemption is correct, which the Defendants dispute, the 
Utah Statutory Exemption, as written, is vague on its face and as applied to 
the Defendants, it does not afford ordinary citizens, including the Defen-
dants James and Linda Mooney, adequate notice that the language "members 
of the Native American Church" utilized in the Exemption, does not 
encompass: (1) members of the Defendant Native American Church who 
are not Native American Indians, and (2) Native American Indian members 
who are not members of a federally recognized tribe. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the lower court's denial of the 
Defendants' motion to dismiss the criminal charges against them was 
incorrect and must be reversed by this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
I The Lower Court Erred In Ruling That The Utah Statutory 
Exception From Criminal Prosecution For The Religious Use 
Of Peyote By Members Of The Native American Church, 
Excludes Non-Indian Church Members And Native American 
Indian Members Who Are Not Members Of A Federally 
Recognized Tribe 
A. Utah Law Incorporates The Federal Exemption For The Religious 
Use Of Peyote By Members of the Native American Church 
Under §58-37-2(1 )(e)(i) of the Utah Controlled Substances Act, 
Addendum 3, the term "controlled substance" means: 
A drug or substances included in Schedules I, II, HI, IV 
or V of Section 58-37-4, and also includes a drug or 
substance included in Schedules 7, II, III, IV, or V 
of the federal Controlled Substances Act, Title II, 
P.L. 91-513, or any controlled substances analog. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
Peyote is listed as a controlled substance in Schedule I of the Utah 
Controlled Substances Act, §58-37-4(2)(a)(iii), Addendum 3, and is also 
listed in Schedule I of the federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 
§812(c), Addendum 5. Section 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii) of the Utah Controlled 
Substances Act provides that 
Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in 
another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, 
or preparation which contains any (Q) peyote", is a 
Schedule I controlled substance. (Emphasis supplied). 
Schedule I of the federal Controlled Substances Act does provide a 
specific exception from criminal prosecution for the nondrug, religious use 
of peyote by members of the Native American Church. Id. This exception, 
codified in Title 21 C.F.R. §1307.31, provides that: 
The listing of peyote as a controlled substance in Schedule 
I does not apply to the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide 
religious ceremonies of the Native American Church, and 
members of the Native American Church so using peyote 
are exempt from registration. Any person who manufactures 
peyote for or distributes peyote to a Native American Church 
is required to register annually and to comply with all other 
requirements of law. 
Thus, pursuant to §58-37-4(2)(a)(iii) of the Utah Controlled 
Substances Act, the foregoing exception from criminal prosecution for the 
religious use of peyote by Native American Church members, is 
incorporated as a statutory exception under the Utah Controlled Substances 
Act. This exemption is referred to herein as the "Utah Statutory Exemption." 
B. The Lower Court's Racially And Politically Restrictive 
Interpretation Of The Utah Statutory Exception Is Contrary 
To Applicable Rules Of Statutory Construction 
Although not expressly disagreeing with the Defendants' argument 
that the Utah Controlled Substances Act, §58-37-1 et seq., Addendum 3, 
incorporates the federal exemption for the religious use of peyote by 
members of the Native American Church codified in 21 C.F.R. §3107.31, 
the lower court held that the language "members of the Native American 
Church" contained in the Utah Statutory Exemption does not apply to non-
Indian members of the Native American Church, stating: 
This Court agrees with the State that the extension of 
protection listed in 21 C.F.R. §1307.31 from prosecution 
does not apply to non-Indian members of the NAC. It is 
clear to this court that the protection from prosecution 
of non-Indians, regardless of whether they are members of 
the NAC, is not a 'specific exception' within the meaning 
of §58-37-4." (Emphasis supplied). 
See, Ruling, 3-4, Addendum 1. The lower court also ostensibly agreed with 
the State that the 1994 American Indian Religious Freedom Act 
Amendments ("AIRFAA"), further limit the language "members of the 
Native American Church" in the federal exemption in 21 C.F.R. §1307.31 to 
exclude even Native American Indian members of the Native American 
Church who are not members of a federally recognized tribe. See, Ruling, 7-
8, Addendum 1. 
1. The Lower Court's Racially And Politically Restrictive 
Interpretation Of The Utah Statutory Exception Ignores 
The Plain Words Of The Exception 
"It is a 'fundamental rule' that constitutional questions should not be 
reached if the merits of the case can be determined other than on constitu-
tional grounds." Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Dav Saints, 
2001 UT 25, H 30, 21 P.3d 198, citing Hovle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240, 242 
(Utah 1980). Thus, the Defendants first address their argument that the 
lower court's racially and religiously restrictive interpretation of the Utah 
Statutory Exemption is incorrect because it violates the plain language of the 
Utah statutory exemption. See, Ruling, at 3-4, Addendum 1. 
In State In Interest of A.B., 936 P.2d 1091, 1097 (Utah App. 1997), 
the Utah Court of Appeals summarizes the basic rules of statutory 
construction applicable in this jurisdiction: 
Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this 
Court will not look beyond the same to divine legislative 
intent. Rather, we are guided by the rule that a statute should 
generally be construed according to its plain language." 
Brinkerhoffv. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989) 
(" ' The best evidence of the true intent and purpose of 
the Legislature in enacting the Act is the plain language 
of the Act.'" Salt Lake City v. Ohms. 881 P.2d 844, 850 
n. 14 (Utah 1994) (explaining statutory language is first 
source of statutory interpretation: "The reason for such 
a rule is clear. It prevents judges from 'finding' an 
ambiguity . . . in an attempt to justify an interpretation 
they prefer."); see also 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland 
Statutory Construction §45.08, at 35 (5th ed. 1992) 
(noting that to interpret statutes by reference to legislative 
debates actually erodes due process notice function of 
statute.) Furthermore, "unless the statute on its face is 
unclear or ambiguous, we find no need to delve into the 
uncertain facts of legislative history. Visitor Inf. Ctr. 
Auth. v. Customer Ser. Div. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 
930 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Utah 1997); accord Salt Lake Child 
and Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick. 890 P.2d 1017, 
1020 (Utah 1995) (" 'When language is clear and unambiguous, 
it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is 
left for construction.'" (citations omitted); see also State v. 
Valdez, 933 P.2d 400, 401 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (stating 
"only if the plain language of the statute is unclear do 
we 'resort to legislative history and purpose for guidance.'" 
(citation omitted). 
See also, accord, World Peace Movement v. Newspaper Agency. 1994 UT 
879P.2d253,259. 
At least twenty eight states, including Utah, have statutory exemptions 
in their drug laws for the religious use of peyote by members of the Native 
American Church. See, AIRFAA, 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (a) (3), Addendum 14, 
at 1 (28 states); U.S. v. Boyll 774 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (D.N.M. 1991) 
("BoyJi") (23 states). 
Although some states have chosen to enact a statutory exception from 
criminal prosecution for the religious use of peyote by members of the 
Native American Church, which restricts the exception by race, blood 
quantum, and/or political status, e.g. membership in a federally recognized 
tribe, 6 a number of states, including Utah, have opted to incorporate the 
language of the federal exemption codified in 21 C.F.R. §3107.31 in their 
controlled substances laws, or to create a specific exemption which applies 
6 See, e.g. Texas Statutes, Health and Safety Exemptions. $481.111(a). 
(exemption for Native American Indians with 25% Native American blood); 
Idaho Statutes. §37-2732A (exemption for Native American Indians who are 
members, or eligible for membership, in a federally recognized tribe), 
collected in Addendum 9. 
broadly to all "members of the Native American Church." 7 Several other 
states have created a specific exemption for the religious use of peyote by 
members of any bona fide religious group,"8 and in Oregon, the bona fide 
religious use of peyote is an affirmative statutory defense to criminal 
prosecution for possession or delivery of peyote. 
Because the states have taken different approaches in addressing the 
religious use of peyote by members of the Native American Church, the 
7 See, e.g., Revised Code of Washington, §69.50.204; "Unless specifically 
excepted by state or federal law or regulation ..."; Alaska Statutes, 
§11.71.195 ("a substance ... which is explicitly exempt from criminal 
penalty under federal law is exempt from the application of this chapter"); 
Iowa Statutes, §124.204(exemption for peyote used in bona fide religious 
ceremonies of the Native American Church); Oklahoma Administrative 
Code, §475:10-2-23 (exemption for non-drug use of peyote in bona fide 
religious ceremonies of Native American Church); South Dakota Statutes. 
§34-20B-14 (17) ("Peyote, except when used as a sacramental in services of 
the Native American Church ... is hereby excepted"); Wisconsin 1999-2000 
Statutes, §961.115 (exemption for the nondrug use of peyote and mescaline 
in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American Church."); 
Minnesota Statutes, §152.02(4), (exemption for "the nondrug use of peyote 
in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American Church), collected 
in Addendum 10. 
8 See, e.g., Colorado Revised Statutes, §18-18-418(3), (exemption for 
peyote used in religious ceremonies of any bona fide religious organization); 
New Mexico Statutes, §30-31 -6 (exemption for use of peyote in bona fide 
religious ceremonies by a bona fide religious organization); Nevada Revised 
Statutes, §453.541, (exemption for peyote use in religious rites of any bona 
fide religious organization), collected in Addendum 11. 
9 See, Oregon Statutes, §475.992 (affirmative defense for certain peyote 
uses), Addendum 12. 
scope of the statutory exception under Utah law must be analyzed in the 
light of the Utah Legislature's considered approach to the matter, Utah rules 
of statutory construction and the unique limitations on the construction of 
the Utah Statutory Exemption imposed by the Utah Constitution. 
In U.S. v. Bovll, 774 F. Supp 133 ,1342 (D.N.M. 1991), Chief Judge 
Burciaga dismissed the federal criminal prosecution of a non-Indian 
member of a Taos Native American Church for possession and 
transportation of peyote for use in Native American Church ceremonies, 
under the federal exception in 21 C.F.R. §3107.31, incorporated in §58-37-
4(2)(a)(iii) of the Utah Controlled Substances Act. (Emphasis supplied) 
Employing canons of statutory construction similar to those utilized in by 
this Court, Chief Judge Burciaga held that the racially restrictive 
interpretation of the federal exception for the religious use of peyote by 
members of the Native American Church, advocated by the federal 
government in Bovll, and adopted by the lower court in this case, was 
inconsistent with the plain language of the exception: 
The language of 21 C.F.R. §1307.31 is clear, unambiguous 
and wholly consistent with the regulation's history and 
purpose. The plain language of 21 C.F.R. §1307.31 
exempts all worshipers engaged "in bona fide religious 
ceremonies of the Native American Church." The 
regulation plainly declares Congress' purpose to exempt 
Native American Church members. Nowhere is it even 
suggested that the exemption applies only to Indian 
members of the Native American Church. Had the intent 
been to exclude non-Indian members, as the United 
States argues, the language of the exemption would 
have so clearly provided. Indeed, the federal peyote 
exemption makes no reference whatsoever to a racial 
exclusion. Compare 21 C.F.R. §1307.31 & N.M. Stat. 
Ann. 30-31-6D (Supp. 1989) with Tex. Health & Safety 
Code Ann. §481.111 (Vernon 1989) (including the 
language 'the exemption granted to members of the 
Native American Church under this section does not 
apply to a member with less than 25 percent Indian Blood.") 
Bovll at 1338-1339; See also, State v. Wittingham, 504 P.2d 950, 951 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1973) (NAC membership to non-Indians is usually not refused), 
cert, denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974). 
In the case at bar, the lower court did not examine the plain words of 
the Utah Statutory Exemption for the religious use of peyote by members of 
a Native American Church. See, Ruling, passim, Addendum 1. However, 
the Defendants submit that as in Bovll, a plain reading of the Utah Statutory 
Exemption indicates that the Exemption encompasses all members of the 
Native American Church without limitation. Had the Utah legislature 
desired to restrict the language of the statutory exemption, it would have so 
provided. Thus, the lower court's racially and politically restrictive 
interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption is contrary to the plain 
language of the Exemption covering all "members of the Native American 
Church/' and should be reversed. 
2. The History And Tradition Of The Native American Church 
As It Bears On The Legislative History Of The Federal 
Exception Is Inconsistent With The Lower Court's 
Racially Restrictive Interpretation Of The Utah 
Statutory Exemption 
In examining the legislative history of the federal Native American 
Church exception in Boyll, Chief Judge Burciaga made factual findings that 
Unlike more traditional churches, the Native American 
Church is a non-hierarchical church and has no central 
organization which dictates church policy. The Native 
American Church consists of a number of loosely 
affiliated local chapters. Each chapter is responsible for 
establishing its own charter, if it so chooses. "Each 
congregation makes its own rules, just as each meeting 
is conducted by its own roadman." Peyote Religion at 
334. Nevertheless, the teachings of all the Native 
American church chapters are essentially the same. 
"Church" refers to a body of believers and their shared 
practices, rather than the existence of a formal structure 
or membership roll. Membership in the Native American 
Church derives from the sincerity of one's beliefs and 
participation in its ceremonies. Historically, the Church 
has been hospitable to and, in fact, has proselytized non-
Indians. The vast majority of Native American Church 
congregations maintain an "open door" policy and 
do not exclude persons on the basis of their race. Racial 
restrictions to membership have never been a general part 
of the Peyote Religion or of the Native American Church, 
(citations omitted). Although one branch of the Native 
American Church, the Native American Church of North 
America, is known to restrict membership to Native Americans, 
most other branches of the Native American Church do not. 
As a result, non-Indian members are accepted within the 
Native American Church. 
Boyll at 1336-1337. Chief Judge Buciaga made further evidentiary findings 
regarding the legislative history of the federal exemption, concluding that 
During hearings on the federal Controlled Substances Act 
of 1970, a representative of the Bureau of Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drugs, presently the Drug Enforcement Agency, 
explained the rationale for the special exemption and assured 
Congress that the exemption would not be effected by the new 
legislation: 
We consider the Native American Church to be sui generis. 
The history and tradition of the church is such that there 
is no question but that they regard peyote as a deity as it 
were, and we will continue the exemption, (emphasis 
added). Native American Church, 468 F. Supp. At 1251, 
quoting Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1970, 
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Public Health & 
Welfare of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, House of Representatives, 91st Cong., 
2dSess. 117-18(1970). 
Chief Judge Burciaga also noted that the final order of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration in connection with the exemption "made no 
mention of any distinction between Indian and non-Indian members of the 
Native American Church." Boyll at 1339 (citations omitted). 
Based upon the foregoing evidence, Chief Judge Burciaga concluded 
that "clearly, the nature and history of the Native American Church played a 
significant role in the promulgation of 21 C.F.R. §1307.31, and the history 
of the Native American Church attests to the fact that non-Indian worshipers 
have always been, and continue to be, active and sincere members of the 
Native American Church." Id.10 Similarly, in this case, the Defendants 
presented undisputed evidence that since its establishment in 1997, the 
Defendant Oklevueha Native American Church has welcomed members of 
all races. See, Case No. 36, R. 244, fflj 8-11. 
The lower court opinion does not discuss or even mention Bovll, but 
instead relies on the decisions in Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 
556 F. Supp. 632, 638 (N.D. Tex. 1983) ("Peyote Way"), and United States 
v. Warner, 595 F. Supp. 595, 598-599 (D.N.D. 1984) ("Warner"), as 
authority for its racially and politically restrictive interpretation of the 
federal exemption. See, Ruling, at 5, 7, Addendum 1. However, in each of 
10 In concluding that the "the legislative history clearly does not support a 
finding that Congress was interested in a broad exemption for religious use 
of peyote by non-NAC members or non-Indians", See, Ruling, at 7, 
Addendum 1, the lower court, while not discussing Bovll, relies on the 
testimony from the same legislative hearings Judge Burciaga cites in Bovll 
to support his conclusion that the basis for the exception was "the unique 
history and tradition of the NAC" and that it extended to all members of the 
Native American Church, "Indian and non-Indian alike." Compare, Ruling, 
at 5, Addendum 1, and Bovll, at 1339. 
those cases, the courts held that the federal exemption contained in 21 
C.F.R. §3107.31 was limited to Native American Indians with at least 25% 
Indian blood, by referring to the bylaws of the Native American Church of 
North America (UNACNA"), one of the churches within the Native 
American Church that restricts its membership to Native American Indians 
who have at least 25% Native American Indian blood. See, Pevote Way, at 
638; Warner, at 598-599. Conversely, in Boyll, based on an extensive 
evidentiary hearing, Judge Burciaga concluded that the racially restrictive 
membership bylaws of the NACNA are not binding on, or representative of, 
other Native American Church chapters and that, in fact, most Native 
American Church chapters have traditionally accepted non-Indians as 
members, such that non-Indian members of the Native American Church are 
covered by the exemption. See, Boyll at 1336-1337. 
In the absence of any legislative history indicating that the Utah 
Legislature intended the statutory exemption of "members of a Native 
American Church" to exclude (1) non-Indian members of the Native 
American Church and (2) Native American Indians who do not belong to 
federally recognized tribes, the lower court erred in so interpreting the 
exemption. Accordingly, the lower court's decision should be reversed. 
II The Lower Court's Racially And Politically Restrictive 
Interpretation Of The Utah Statutory Exemption Violates The 
Defendants' Rights Under The Utah Constitution 
Because the lower court denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss 
the multiple felony charges against them by adopting the racially restrictive 
interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption, the lower court erred in 
failing to consider or address the Defendants' arguments that its racially and 
politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption violates 
the Defendants rights under the Utah Constitution. See, Ruling, passim, 
Addendum I. 
A. The History Of The Religious Rights Provisions Of The 
The Utah Constitution As A Foundation For Analysis Of 
The Lower Court's Challenged Statutory Interpretation 
The Utah Constitution provides far more expansive guarantees against 
State interference in the rights of individuals to engage in religious worship 
than the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, due to the 
national concerns for the separation of Church and State that attended Utah's 
struggle for admission to the United States. This unique and complex history 
is extensively chronicled by the Court in Society of Separationists v. 
Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916,920-940 (Utah 1993) ("Whitehead") and need not 
be repeated here." 
Because of Utah's unique history in the area of Church/State relations, 
courts of this State cannot be guided solely by judicial interpretations of 
religious rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
As this Court observed 
The federal rulings set the floor for federal constitutional 
protections which we must respect in interpreting the scope 
of our own constitutional provisions. But the federal courts 
have an entirely different task before them than do we. 
They have only a cryptic sentence to interpret; we have 
paragraphs that are expressed in clearer terms and are given 
even more vivid meaning by our unique and relatively, 
recent history." 
See, Whitehead, at 940. Accordingly, the Court concluded in Whitehead, 
that 
Ultimately, our (statutory) construction is the one most 
consistent with the Utah Constitution's religious and 
conscience provisions, read in light of the history of the 
religious conflict that marked the years Utah struggled to 
become a state. Government is not to prefer religion to 
nonreligion, but neither should it be hostile to religion. 
Religious exercise is to be unfettered, and freedom of 
conscience is to be supreme. 
11 In Whitehead, the Court recognized a private right of action under 
Article 1, Section 4, of the Utah Constitution, to challenge the constitution-
ality of the Salt Lake City Council's practice of opening their meetings with 
prayer as an unlawful establishment of religion. Id. at 992. 
Id., (Emphasis supplied); See also, Green v. Zendrian, 916 F. Supp. 493,498 
(D. Md. 2996) ("It is axiomatic that questions of sate constitutional law are 
to be answered by state courts, rather than by the federal judiciary.") 
B. The Anti-Establishment And Free Exercise of Religion Provisions 
of Article I, Sections 1 And 4, And Article III, Section 1 of 
The Utah Constitution 
Article I, section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides, in pertinent part, 
that 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy 
and defend their lives and liberties, ... to worship according 
to the dictates of their own conscience .... 
Article I, section 4 of the Utah Constitution provides that 
Religious Liberty - The right of conscience shall never 
be infringed. The State shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion ox prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof no religious test shall be required as qualification 
for any office of public trust or for any vote at any election; 
nor shall any person be incompetent as a witness or juror 
on account of religious belief or the absence thereof. 
There shall be no union of Church and State, nor shall any 
Church dominate the State or interfere with its functions. 
No public money or property shall be appropriated for 
or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, 
or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No 
property qualification shall be required of any person to 
vote, or hold office, except as provided in this constitution. 
(Emphasis supplied)12 
12 In Whitehead, this Court observed that, "While we recognize that 
portions of Article 1, Section 4 were drawn directly from outside sources, 
certain aspects of the provision are unique to Utah. For example, no other 
state constitution forbids the union of church and state or the domination 
or interference by any church with state functions." Id. at 935 (citations 
omitted). 
Article III, section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides, in pertinent 
part, that: 
First: Perfect toleration of religious sentiment is guaranteed. 
No inhabitant of this State shall ever be molested in person or 
in property on account of his or her mode of religious 
worship... 
In Whitehead, the Court distilled certain themes underlying the fore-
going constitutional provisions, observing that 
[R]eading the text of the constitution's religion and 
conscience clauses in light of history, we identify three 
complementary themes: (i) a distancing of government from 
involvement with religion; (ii) nonsectarianism to the extent 
there is government involvement with religion, and (iii) 
government neutrality - the maintenance of a level playing 
field in civil matters - as between religious and non-religious 
sentiments." (citations omitted) These themes find expression 
in the "rights of conscience'1 and the "perfect toleration of 
religious liberties" language in article Ill's ordinance and 
seem to have been a natural common ground to the veterans 
of Utah's struggle for statehood.... 
Id. at 936. 
With the foregoing historical interpretive principles in mind, the 
Defendants turn to an analysis of their claim that the lower court's racially 
and politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption, 
violates the establishment and the free exercise guarantees of Article I, 
sections 1 and 4 and Article III, section 1, of the Utah Constitution. 
C. The Lower Court's Racially And Politically Restrictive 
Interpretation Of The Utah Statutory Exemption Violates 
Article I, Sections 1 and 4, and Article III, Section 1, Of The 
Utah Constitution 
As a factual matter, the lower court concedes that the Native 
American Church "is an established religion with a significant history of 
sacramental peyote use" and that the use of peyote as a sacramental ritual is 
a significant process in the religious practices of the NAC" such that "the 
State's prosecution of Defendants for their use and possession of (sic) 
distribution of peyote may create an imposition or burden on the Defendants 
as members of the NAC." See, Ruling, at 3-5, Addendum I. 
The Defendants contend that such a burden is not only likely as the 
lower court found, but substantial and intolerable, because "the use of peyote 
by Native American Church members is the very essence of their religion." 
Boyll, at 1342 (citing cases). 
Similarly, the Defendants in this case have provided undisputed 
evidence that the worship of peyote as a deity and sacrament is the heart of 
the religious worship practiced by members of the Defendant Native 
American Church. See, Case No. 36, R. 244, 1fl| 8-11 Thus, for the State to 
establish racial and political qualifications for membership in the Defendant 
Oklevueha Native American Church, by criminalizing the religious use of 
peyote by (1) non-Indian members of the Church and (2) Native American 
Indian members who do not belong to a federally recognized tribe, deprives 
the excluded members of the Defendant Oklevueha Native American Church 
of their "inherent and inalienable rights ... to worship according to the 
dictates of their own conscience", in violation of Article I, section 1 of the 
Utah Constitution, and violates their rights against "an infringement of 
conscience", to the "free exercise" of their religious beliefs under Article I, 
section 4, and their rights "not to ever be molested in person or in property on 
account of his or her mode of religious worship..." under Article HI, section 
1, which here involves the use of peyote in religious ceremonies of the 
Defendant Oklevueha Native American Church. (Emphasis supplied) 
Because the decision as to who may be members of the Defendant 
Oklevueha Native American Church is an internal Church decision which 
the foregoing constitutional provisions safeguard from interference by State 
government, the lower court's racially and politically restrictive 
interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption, violates the Defendants' 
rights against "an establishment of religion" under Article I, section 4, of the 
Utah Constitution, and constitutes an unlawful preference of one religion 
over another, in violation of the principles of (i) distancing of government 
from involvement with religion; (ii) nonsectarianism to the extent there is 
government involvement with religion, and (iii) government neutrality, this 
Court held to underlie the guarantees of religious freedom in the Utah 
Constitution. See, Whitehead, at 936. 
The lower court's racially and politically restrictive interpretation of 
the Utah Statutory Exemption for the religious use of peyote by Native 
American Church members, if sustained, would also constitute an 
establishment of religion and a denial of the free exercise guarantees 
contained in Article I, sections 1 and 4, and Article III, section 1, of the Utah 
Constitution, by sanctioning the use of state employees, including state 
prosecutors and judges, and the use of state funds for the surveillance, 
investigation, arrest, detention, criminal prosecution, trial and imprisonment 
on felony drug charges, of all non-Indian members of the Defendant 
Oklevueha Native American Church, and all Native American Indian 
members of the Defendant Church, solely on account of their "mode of 
religious worship", e.g. the religious use of peyote in bona fide ceremonies 
of the Native American Church. Such a use of the State judicial and 
prosecutorial powers and funds violates the "perfect toleration of religious 
sentiment" and the protection from State interference and molestation on 
account of an individual's "mode of religious worship", guaranteed in 
Article III, section 1, of the Utah Constitution. 
1. Application Of The Compelling Interest Test 
As the lower court agreed, assuming that the State can identify a 
compelling interest to support the racially and politically restrictive interpre-
tation of the Utah Statutory Exemption for the religious use of peyote by 
members of the Native American Church, traditional free exercise 
jurisprudence requires the State to show that the lower court's racially and 
politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption is the 
least restrictive means to achieve such an interest. See, Ruling, at 4, 
Addendum I, quoting Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment 
Security Division, 450 U.S. 707, 718, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 1432, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 
(1980). "The compelling interest test reflects the First Amendment's mandate 
of preserving religious liberty to the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic 
society." See, Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 903, 110 S.Ct. 1595,1613,108 L.Ed.2d 
876 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring.) 
In Smith, the United States Supreme Court abandoned the compelling 
interest test in cases involving a "neutral, generally applicable [criminal] 
law", reasoning that the application of such a statute does not implicate First 
Amendment concerns. Smith, at 872-873. However, the federal exception 
for the nondrug, religious use of peyote by "members of the Native 
American Church" contained in 21 C.F.R. §3107.31 and incorporated under 
§ 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii) of the Utah Controlled Substances Act, is not a "neutral, 
generally applicable criminal law." Instead, the Utah Statutory Exemption is 
specifically directed to the religious practices of a particular group of: 
members of the Native American Church. Thus, Smith does not apply and 
the validity of the lower court's racially and politically restrictive interpre-
tation of the Utah Statutory Exemption must be assessed under the 
traditional compelling interest test. See, Salvation Army v. N.J. Dept. of 
Comm. Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 194, 204 (3rd Cir. 1990) (distinguishing 
Smith); See also, Boyjl, at 1341 (distinguishing Smith and applying 
compelling interest test to federal exemption in 21 C.F.R. §3107.31). 
2. The State Has Failed To Carry Its Burden Of Presenting 
Evidence To Demonstrate That The Lower Court's Racially 
And Politically Restrictive Interpretation Of The Utah 
Statutory Exemption Is Necessary And The Least Restrictive 
Means Of Achieving Any Compelling State Interest 
Although the lower court held that the State has compelling interests 
in "dealing with the growing menace of drug abuse in the United States" 
and prosecuting the "illegal use of peyote", See, Ruling, at 5-6, Addendum 
I, (Emphasis supplied), Congress has specifically found and concluded that 
the religious use of peyote by members of the Native American Church 
poses no substantial threat to the public health, safety and welfare, and 
therefore should be "legal." I3 Hence, the federal exception from criminal 
prosecution for the religious use of peyote in Native American Church 
ceremonies contained in 21 C.F.R. §1307.31, incorporated in §58-37-
4(2)(a)(iii) the Utah Controlled Substances Act. The very existence of these 
exemptions evidences a compelling interest of the State of Utah and the 
federal government, in protecting the free exercise of religion for members 
of the Native American Church. See, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 
Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546-547,113 S.Ct. 2217, 2234, 124 L.Ed.2d 
417 (1993) (an interest served by a statute is not compelling where the 
statutory framework permits derogation of that interest.) 
Moreover, the State has failed to present any evidence of a compelling 
interest sufficient to demonstrate that the religious use of peyote by (1) non-
Indian members of the Defendant Native American Church, or by (2) Native 
American Indian members of the Church who are not members of a 
13 During the 1994 hearings concerning the American Indian Religious 
Freedom Act Amendments (AIRFAA), Congress reaffirmed the factual 
findings in Smith that peyote is distinguishable from all other Schedule I 
drugs because: (1) it does not cause injury to the religious user; (2) it is 
neither physiologically or psychologically addicting; (3) peyote does not 
contribute to illegal drug trafficking problems facing America; (4) there is 
no known black market for it; and (5) peyote may even be helpful in 
controlling alcoholism among Native Americans (and presumably non-
Native Americans), H.R. Rep. No. 675,103d Cong., 2nd Sess. 7 (1994). 
federally recognized tribe, pose any more of a "substantial threat to public 
health, safety and welfare" than the religious use of peyote by Native 
American Indian members of the Native American Church who are 
members of a federally recognized tribe. "In the absence of evidence, we 
cannot simply assume that the psychedelic is so baneful that its use must be 
prohibited to a group of [non-Indian] members but poses no equal threat 
when used by [Indian] members of the Native American Church." Boyll, 
at 1342 (applying First Amendment). 
The Defendants also dispute the lower court's conclusion that the 
1994 American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments (AIRFAA), 
indicates Congress' intent to restrict the federal exemption incorporated in 
the Utah Controlled Substances Act, only to Native American Indian 
members of Native American Church who are members of federally 
recognized tribes. See, Ruling, at 6-7, Addendum I. AIRFA and AIRFAA 
are inclusive, not exclusive, and do not mention any intent to limit the 
federal exception contained in 21 C.F.R. §3107.31, to exclude (1) non-
Indian members, or (2) Native American Indians who are not members of 
federally recognized tribes, from the larger class of "Native American 
Church members" designated in the exemption. See, AIRFA, Addendum 
13, and AIRFAA, Addendum 14.14 
Although the lower court suggests that AIRFAA indicates that a 
racially and politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory 
Exemption is necessary to advance the federal government's "compelling 
interests" in fulfilling its duty to protect Native American Indian culture and 
religion, Ruling, at 7, Addendum I, the same arguments were recently 
rejected by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in U.S. v. Hardman, 297 F.2d 
1116, 1128-1129, 1133-1134, (10th Cir. August 5,2002) (rehearing en banc). 
In Hardman, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying 1993 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-2000bb-
14 It must also be remembered that Congress enacted AIRFA in 1993 and 
AIRFAA in 1994, in reaction to the 1990 Smith decision, which abandoned 
the compelling interest test and upheld a general Oregon law which 
criminalized possession and use of peyote. Because of the federal 
government's special duties and responsibilities with respect to Indian tribes, 
Congress was undoubtedly focused on assuring the rights of Native 
American Indians to practice their traditional Native American religion by 
federal statute in the wake of Smith. However, there is nothing in this 
laudable purpose that demonstrates any "compelling interest" in the federal 
government to limit the membership in the Native American Church (which 
would be contrary to its avowed interest in preserving Native American 
culture and religion), by imposing de facto racial or political qualifications 
for membership in the Native American Church by restricting the federal 
exemption from criminal prosecution to cover only Native American Indians 
who are members of a federally recognized tribe. 
-4, Addendum 15,15 held that regulations pursuant to a federal statutory 
exception under the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act ("BGEPA"), 
permitting the possession of bald or golden eagle feathers for religious 
purposes and requiring an individual seeking a permit under the exemption 
to be "a member of a federally recognized tribe", See, 50 C.F.R. §22.22 
(1999), violated the rights of a Native American Indian who was not a 
member of a federally recognized tribe. Id. at 1129-1134. 
Accepting the federal government's argument that it had "compelling 
interests" in (1) preserving Native American culture and religion, and (2) 
fulfilling trust and treaty obligations to the federally recognized Indian 
tribes" in enacting the challenged permit system, the Tenth Circuit held that 
the regulation nonetheless failed under RFRA, because the government 
failed to provide evidence to demonstrate that restricting permits to 
15 Because RFRA was meant to restore the compelling interest test 
previously abandoned in Smith, See, Hardman. at 1129-1130, Hardman 
is relevant to the determination of whether the lower court's politically 
restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption limiting its 
coverage to only Native American Indians who are "members of a federally" 
recognized tribe, is the least restrictive means of furthering the government's 
"compelling interest" in protecting Native American culture and religion, so 
as to override the Defendants' fundamental rights of religious belief and 
exercise under Article 1, sections 1 and 4, and Article III, section 1, of the 
Utah Constitution. 
"members of federally recognized Tribes" was necessary and the least 
restrictive means of achieving these compelling interests. Id. 
Similarly, in the case at bar, the State has failed to introduce any 
evidence to demonstrate that restricting the Utah Statutory Exemption for 
the religious use of peyote by Native American Church members to include 
only "members of a federally recognized tribes", while excluding (1) non-
Indian members, and (2) Native American Indians who are not members of a 
federally recognized tribe, is necessary or the least restrictive means of 
advancing the federal government's compelling interests in protecting 
Native American Indian culture and religion.16 In the absence of such 
evidence, the State has failed to carry its burden to justify its infringement of 
the Defendants' rights under the "anti-establishment" and "free exercise" 
guarantees contained in Article I, sections 1 and 4, and Article III, section 1, 
of the Utah Constitution. Thus, the Court should reverse the lower court's 
decision denying the Defendants' motion to dismiss the criminal charges 
16 "Allowing a wider variety of people to participate in Native American 
religion could just as easily foster Native American culture and religion by 
exposing it to a wider array of persons." Hardman, at 1133. 
against them. 
D. The Lower Court's Racially And Politically Restrictive 
Interpretation Of The Utah Statutory Exemption Violates 
The Defendants' Right To The Equal Operation Of Laws 
The Defendants contend that the lower court's racially and politically 
restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption, violates both the 
uniform operation of laws provision of the Utah Constitution, Utah Const. 
art. I, §24, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, U.S. Const, amend. XIV, §1. 
1. The Relationship Between The Equal Operation Of The 
Laws Provision In Article I, section 24, Of The Utah 
Constitution And The Federal Equal Protection Clause 
Article I, section 24, of the Utah Constitution provides that: "All laws 
of a general nature shall have uniform operation." The Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits a state from enacting 
laws that deny "any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws." U.S. Const, amend. XIV, §1. "Both constitutional provisions 
incorporate the 'basic principles of equal protection of the law [that J are 
17 See, Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d 947, 954 (Utah 1994) (Utah statutory 
privilege for non-penitential communications between a lay person and a 
clergyman should not be interpreted so as to raise serious constitutional 
questions under Article I, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution.) 
inherent in the very concept of justice and are a necessary attribute of a just 
society.' " Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984) ("Malan"), 
(internal citations omitted). "[T]he language and history" of the uniform 
operation of laws provision contained in Article I, §24 of the Utah 
Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
"are entirely different, and even though there are important areas of overlap 
in the concepts embodied in the two provisions," [and] ... "the differences 
can produce different legal consequences." Gallivan, 2000 UT 89, f 33, 
quoting Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 577 (Utah 1993) ("Lee"); See also, 
State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 997, (Utah 1995), (quoting Lee); Malan, 693 
P.2d at 670. 
1. The Meaning Of The Equal Operation Of The Laws 
Provision of Article I, Section 24, Of The Utah Constitution 
Article I, section 24, of the Utah Constitution states: "All laws of a 
general nature shall have uniform operation." The essence of this constitu-
tional provision is "the settled concern of the law that the legislature be 
restrained from the fundamentally unfair practice 'of classifying persons in 
such a manner that those who are similarly situated with respect to the 
purpose of the law are treated differently by that law, to the detriment of 
some of those so classified." See, Gallivan, 2002 UT 89,1J36, citing Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield of Utah v. State. 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989) 
(quoting Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 752 P.2d at 888.) "In order for a law to 
be constitutional under the uniform operation of laws provision, it is not 
enough that it be uniform on its face. What is critical is that the operation of 
the law be uniform." Lee, 867 P.2d at 577; See also, Mohi, 901 P.2d at 997. 
A law does not operate uniformly if persons "similarly situated" are 
not "treated similarly" or if "persons in different circumstances" are "treated 
as if their circumstances were the same." Lee, 867 P.2d at 577, quoting 
Malan, at 669 (Utah 1984). In other words, "when persons are similarly 
situated, it is unconstitutional to single out one person or group of persons 
from among the larger class on the basis of a tenuous justification that has 
little or no merit." See, Gallivan, 2002 Utah 89, ^ 37, quoting Malan, 693 
P.2d at 671. "Therefore, the equal protection principle inherent in the 
uniform operation of laws provision protects against discrimination within 
a class and guards against disparate effects in the application of laws." 
Gallivan, at ^ |38. "Ultimately, it is the judiciary's province to decide the vital 
and determinative question of 'whether a classification operates uniformly 
on all persons similarly situated within constitutional parameters.'" Id. 
"Where a legislative enactment implicates a 'fundamental or critical 
right' or creates classifications which are 'considered impermissible or 
suspect in the abstract,' [the Court applies] a heightened degree of scrutiny. 
Gallivan, at ^40, quoting Ryan, 903 P.2d at 426; See also, Peterson, 2002 
UT 42 at ^|23; Swayne, 795 P.2d at 647 (Zimmerman, J., concurring and 
dissenting); Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 373 (Stewart, J., separate opinion). 
3. Defendants' Claims Under Article I, Section 24 
Based upon the foregoing legal principles, the beginning point for 
analyzing the lower court's racially and politically restrictive interpretation 
of the Utah Statutory Exemption, is to determine whether such an interpre-
tation implicates a "fundamental or critical right", or creates classifications 
which are "considered impermissible or suspect in the abstract." Gallivan, 
at U41, quoting Ryan, 903 P.2d at 426. 
As previously explained, the lower court's racially and politically 
restrictive interpretation of the statutory exception, in its operation, critically 
impacts the fundamental rights of (1) non-Indian members of the Defendant 
Native American Church, and (2) Native American Indian members of the 
Church who are not members of a federally recognized tribe", to be free 
from the establishment of religion and to fully exercise their religious beliefs 
and practices free from molestation or interference by the State. These rights 
have been accorded special recognition under Article I, sections 1 and 4, and 
under Article III, section 1, of the Utah Constitution. Additionally, the lower 
court's exclusion of non-Indians from the protection of the Utah Statutory 
Exemption creates a suspect racial classification. Mountain Fuel Supply v. 
Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 884, 890 (Utah 1988). ("Race" is generally an 
impermissible classification.) Accordingly, the Court must review the lower 
court's racially and politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory 
Exemption, with "heightened scrutiny" and apply the analytical model 
articulated in Lee: 
[A] statutory classification that discriminates against a 
person's constitutionally protected [fundamental or 
critical right]. . .is constitutional only if it (1) is 
reasonable, (2) has more than a speculative tendency 
to further the legislative objective and, in fact, actually 
and substantially furthers a valid legislative purpose, 
and (3) is reasonably necessary to further a legitimate 
legislative goal. 
GalHvan, 2002 UT 89, ^ 42, quoting Lee, at 582-583. 
Before employing the foregoing uniform operation of laws analytical 
model, two threshold issues must be considered: "what, if any, classification, 
is created, and (2) whether that classification is discriminatory; that is, 
whether it treats members of the class or subclasses disparately." See, 
Gallivan, ^43, citing Mohj 901 P.2d at 997. 
First, the lower court's interpretation of the Utah Statutory 
Exemption, as excluding (1) non-Indian members of the Native American 
Church, and (2) Native American Indian members who are not members of 
federally recognized tribes, creates three subclasses of members of the 
Defendant Native American Church, including the two foregoing subclasses, 
and (3) a class of Native American Indian Church members who are 
members of federally recognized tribes. "These subclasses, while not 
expressly created by the statute, result from "the application and operation of 
the statute", as interpreted by the lower court. See, Gallivan, at ^ |44; See 
also, Mohi, at 998, quoting John E. Nowak et al, Constitutional Law 600 
(1983) ("A statute which does not on its face create classes may nonetheless 
result in classification during the actual application of the statute by those 
empowered to administer the law.") Thus, the lower courts racially and 
politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption under 
consideration in this case "does create a system of classification." Id. 
Second, the question arises whether the classification created by the 
lower court's racially restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory 
Exemption is discriminatory, that is, "whether the members of the class or 
subclasses are treated disparately." Gallivan, at ^ [45. This question must be 
also be answered affirmatively in this case, because the lower court's 
racially and politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory 
Exemption operates to subject the first two subclasses of Native American 
Church members to criminal prosecution for their religious use of peyote in 
bona fide Native American Church ceremonies, while retaining the 
protection against criminal prosecution under the exemption only for the 
third subclass of Native American Church members: Native American 
Indians who are members of a federally recognized tribe. 
Accordingly, here, as in Mohi, the lower court's racially and 
politically restrictive application of the Utah Statutory Exemption, would 
allow identically situated members of the Defendant Native American 
Church to "to face radically different penalties and consequences" without 
any distinction between them, other than their race and political status, e.g. 
membership in a federally recognized tribe. See, Mohi, 998. This amounts 
to "unequal treatment" of similarly situated persons, as that term has been 
used in the context of Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution. See, 
Mohi, at 998, citing Blue Cross, 779 P.2d at 637; Malan, 693 P.2d at 670. 
"Having determined that a discriminatory classification and disparate 
impact exist, [the next question is] "whether that discriminatory 
classification is constitutionally permissible under the uniform operation of 
laws provision." See, Gallivan, at |[46. For this analysis, we return to Lee's 
analytical model. Under Lee, the lower court's racially and politically 
restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption fails it 
substantially burdens the religious rights of Native American Church 
members under Article I, sections 1 and 4, and Article III, section 1, of the 
Utah Constitution, and because the State has failed to produce any evidence 
that the lower court's interpretation of the Exemption (1) is reasonable; 
(2) has more than a speculative tendency to actually further any valid 
legislative purpose, and (3) is reasonably necessary to further a legitimate 
legislative goal. Accordingly, the lower court's racially and politically 
restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption is unconstitutional 
under the uniform operation of laws provision of Article I, section 24, of the 
Utah Constitution and must be reversed. 
E. The Lower Court's Racially And Politically Restrictive 
Interpretation Of The Utah Statutory Exemption Violates The 
Defendants' Rights To Due Process Of Law Under Article I, 
Section 7, Of The Utah Constitution And The Fourteenth 
Amendment To The United States Constitution 
In the event that the lower court's racially and politically restrictive 
interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption is correct, which Defendants 
dispute, the Defendants contend that the lower court should have granted 
their motion to dismiss the criminal charges against them, because the Utah 
Statutory Exemption, as written, is vague on its face and as applied to the 
Defendants, and therefore denies them due process of law under Article I, 
section 7 of the Utah Constitution which provides that "No person shall be 
deprived of life liberty or property without due process of law", and under 
the parallel provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.18 
In Utah, the void for vagueness doctrine requires that a statute or 
ordinance define an "offense with sufficient defmiteness that ordinary 
people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does 
not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Greenwood v. 
City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991). See also, Baggett v. 
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) ("In the analysis of a criminal law, the basic test 
for vagueness is whether "men [and women] of common intelligence must 
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.") Where, as 
in the instant case, the challenged statute implicates the fundamental rights 
of Native American Church members against an establishment of religion by 
the State and their rights to the free exercise of religious worship guaranteed 
under Article I, Sections 1 and 4, and Article III, Section 1, of the Utah 
Constitution, the parties challenging the statute as void on its face, need not 
prove that the statute is "impermissibly vague" in all its applications. Jane v. 
18 Because both provisions provide identical rights, no separate analysis 
is required. See, SLW/Utah, Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998), 
quoting West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1004-07 (Utah 1994) 
("when a party asserts claims under both the Utah and federal constitutions, 
this court ordinarily first determines the issue under the Utah Constitution 
and only resorts to the federal Constitution if the state constitution is not 
dispositive." 
Bangerter, 794 F. Supp. 1537, 1541 (U.S.D.C. Utah 1992), quoting Hoffman 
Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 497, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1192, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 
(1982). 
Here, the plain language of the Utah Statutory Exemption, providing 
an exemption from criminal prosecution for the religious use of peyote by 
"members of the Native American Church" in bona fide ceremonies of the 
Native American Church, does not afford ordinary citizens, including the 
Defendants, adequate notice that the language "members of the Native 
American Church" utilized in the Exemption, excludes: (1) members of the 
Defendant Native American Church who are not Native American Indians, 
and (2) Native American Indian members who are not members of a 
federally recognized tribe, and also because it fails to establish clear 
guidelines for application of the exception. As the result, the Defendant 
Native American Church and its spiritual leaders, the Defendants James and 
Linda Mooney, could not reasonably have known that their conduct in 
possessing and providing peyote to other members of the Defendant 
Oklevueha Native American Church for religious use in bona ceremonies of 
the Church, without regard to the race or political status of these members, 
was prohibited under the Utah statutory exemption. 
Accordingly, this Court should find that the prosecution of the 
Defendants under the Utah Statutory Exemption, as written, is unconsti-
tutionally vague on its face, and as applied to the Defendants, and violates 
their rights to due process of law under Article I, section 7, of the Utah 
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. Based on this finding, the 
Court should reverse the lower court's decision denying the Defendants' 
motion to dismiss the criminal charges against them. 
Ill The Lower Court's Racially And Politically Restrictive 
Interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption Violates 
The Defendants' Rights Under The First Amendment 
"The First Amendment to the United States Constitution has been 
made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment." Whitehead, at 
fn. 40, quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut. 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 
903, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940). In order to pass muster under the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment, a government action must satisfy the two 
step analysis of the "compelling interest" test. The Court must first 
determine whether the Government's action "imposes any burden on the free 
exercise of [the defendant's] religion." Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, at 
403, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1794, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1963). Should such a burden 
exist, the court must then "consider whether some compelling state interest 
.. .justifies the substantial infringement of the [defendant's] First 
Amendment right" and is "the least restrictive means of accomplishing a 
compelling state interest." Id. at 406, 83 S.Ct. at 1795. 
As previously discussed herein, the State has failed to demonstrate 
that the lower court's racially and politically restrictive interpretation of the 
Utah Statutory Exemption, furthers any "compelling interest" of the State of 
Utah, which would justify the infringement of the rights of the Defendant 
Native American Church and its spiritual leaders, the Defendants James and 
Linda Mooney, in the practice of their fundamental religious beliefs and 
practices as members of the Defendant Native American Church, or prove 
that such interpretation is necessary or the least restrictive means of 
achieving any such compelling interest. Accordingly, this Court should find 
that the lower court's racially and restrictive interpretation of the Utah 
Statutory Exemption, violates the Defendants' rights under the First 
Amendment and reverse the lower court's denial of the Defendants' motion 
to dismiss the criminal prosecution on this ground. 
IV. The Lower Court's Racially And Politically Restrictive 
Interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption, Violates The 
Defendants Rights Under The Equal Protection Clause 
Of The Fourteenth Amendment 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution declares 
that no state may deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. Equal protection analysis requires strict scrutiny 
analysis when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of 
a fundamental right or operates to the particular disadvantage of a suspect 
class. Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia. 427 U.S. 307, 312 
(1976). In the case at bar, the classification worked by the lower court's 
racially and politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory 
Exemption for the religious use of peyote by members of the Native 
American Church, both interferes with fundamental religious rights under 
Article I, sections 1 and 4 of the Utah Constitution, and "operates to the 
particular disadvantage of a suspect class, e.g. non-Indian members of the 
Native American Church, solely because of their race. In Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 201 (1995),19 the United States 
Supreme Court also held that "all racial classifications" imposed by federal, 
state, or local government actor, are "suspect" and must be analyzed under 
strict scrutiny analysis. In Adarand, the Supreme Court held that a racial 
classification should be upheld only where it is precisely tailored to 
19 In Adarand, a contractor sued federal officials when, when, afler 
making the low bid on the job, the job was awarded to a "disadvantaged" 
minority business under a government contract clause. The Plaintiff 
contractor claimed that the race-based presumptions used in the contract 
clause violated the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment Due 
Process Clause. Id. at 200. 
accomplish a compelling government interest. In this regard, the Court 
stated that 
The standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is 
not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by 
a particular classification."..."The Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments protect persons, not groups." Therefore, 
"[A]ny person, of whatever race, has the right to demand 
that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution 
justify a racial classification subjecting that person to 
unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny." 
Id. at 201-202 (internal citations omitted). 
In this case, the lower court stated that, "the preference given to 
Indian members of the Church is clearly not racial in nature, but political", 
and that such classification is based on the federal government's duty to 
preserve Native American Indian culture", See, Ruling, at 6-7, Addendum 
I, the lower court failed to articulate how the exclusion of non-Indian 
members of the Native American Church from the coverage of the Utah 
Statutory Exemption, is necessary and the least restrictive means of 
accomplishing this alleged interest. Thus, the lower court's racially 
restrictive interpretation of Utah Statutory Exemption violates the Defen-
dants' rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Similarly, lower court's politically restrictive interpretation of the 
Utah Statutory Exemption as being limited, under AIRFAA, to members of 
the Native American Church who are members of a federally recognized 
tribe, See, Ruling, at 6-7, Addendum I, and excluding Native American 
Indians who are not members of a federally recognized tribe, cannot evade 
strict scrutiny analysis under the Equal Protection Clause by labeling the 
classification "political." Id. Although the lower court relied on Peyote 
Way, as support for this conclusion, See, Ruling, at 6, such reliance is 
misplaced. 
In Peyote Way , the court relied heavily on the United States 
Supreme Court's prior decision in Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
In Morton, the Court upheld a BIA employment preference for applicants 
that were "one-fourth or more degree Indian blood and be a member of a 
federally -recognized tribe", stating that the classification was "political 
rather than racial in nature." Id. at 553, n. 24 (Emphasis supplied). 
The Court explained that, the BIA employment preference, "as 
applied, is granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but rather as 
members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and activities are 
governed by the BIA in a unique fashion." Id. at 554. In so holding, the 
Supreme Court emphasized that the government preference did not pertain 
to any government agency or activity other than "employment in the Indian 
service" and that a similar preference concerning employment in other 
federal agencies would present an "obviously more difficult question." 
Id. at 554. Applying a "rational basis" test to the BIA hiring preference, 
the Supreme Court upheld the BIA employment in preference for members 
of federally recognized tribes in Morton, finding that it could be "tied 
rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the 
Indians," and that it was "reasonable and rationally designed to further 
Indian self-government." Id. at 555. 
Although the State in this case may argue that by not limiting the Utah 
Statutory Exemption for the religious use of peyote by members of the Native 
American Church to Native American Indians who are members of federally 
recognized tribes, an impermissible racial classification would result under 
Morton. However, the factual context of this case is immediately distinguish-
able from that addressed in Morton. 
In Morton, the Supreme Court was solely concerned with issues of 
Indian self-government and tribal sovereignty, concluding that the prefer-
ence there was "rationally designed to further Indian self-government..." 
Id. at 555. However, in this case, we are dealing with the free exercise 
20 In a more recent discussion of Morton, the Supreme Court again took 
the opportunity to limit the case solely to its factual context, stating that 
rights of Native American Indian members of the Native American Church. 
Accordingly, the government's asserted interests in Morton do not dictate 
the result here.21 
Because the lower court fails to articulate how its politically 
restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption is necessary, and is 
the least restrictive means of furthering any compelling interest which would 
override the infringement of the Defendants' fundamental religious rights 
discussed herein, such interpretation violates the Defendants' rights to the 
equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.22 Therefore, 
this Court should find that the lower court erred in denying the Defendants' 
motion to dismiss the criminal charges against them based on this ground 
and reverse the lower court's decision. 
"that case was confined to authority of the BIA, an agency described as 'sui 
generis." Rice v. Cavetano, 528 U.S. 495, 519-520 (2000). 
21 Defendants wish to acknowledge that their argument regarding Morton 
is based, in part, on a panel decision of the Tenth Circuit, In the Matter of 
Saenz, 00-2166 (10th Cir. 2001), which was subsequently vacated and 
reheard and decided by the Tenth Circuit in its en banc decision in U.S. v. 
Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1118 (10th Cir. 2002) 
22 See, Adarand, at 224-225, quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 
(1948)] ("Political judgments regarding the necessity for the particular 
classification may be weighed in the constitutional balance, but the standard 
of justification will remain constant.") 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American Church, and 
the Defendants James and Linda Mooney, as its spiritual leaders, respectfully 
request the Court to find and declare that the lower court's racially and 
politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption from 
criminal prosecution for the religious use of peyote by members of the Native 
American Church in bona fide Church ceremonies, violates their rights under 
the Utah Constitution and the federal Constitution as discussed herein. 
Based upon such findings, Defendants further request that the Court 
reverse the decision of the lower court denying their motion to dismiss the 
criminal charges against them. 
DATED and respectfully submitted this 17th day of October, 2002. 
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